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Critical Realism and Systematic Dialectics: A Reply to Andy Brown  
 
Abstract. In `Approach With Caution: Critical Realism in Social Research´, Andy Brown sets out a 
series of criticisms of critical realism from the perspective of systematic dialectics. This current 
article is one critical realist´s reply to Brown.  
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Andy Brown is to be thanked, not only for his thoughtful and critical insights into systematic dialectics and 
critical realism, but also for his scholarly attitude towards debate and discussion. What follows is one 
critical realist´s reply to Brown´s main criticisms - interpreted and summarized in the following paragraph.  
 
Critical realism is said to `cleave´ (an apt metaphor) the social world into multiple, discrete and different 
strata, layers or levels of analysis or abstraction, with associated concepts such as structures, 
mechanisms, powers, agents etc. Once so `cleaved´, the strata and associated concepts are analysed in 
separation from one another and cannot, therefore, be re-integrated. Re-integration is substituted for 
pseudo-systematic abstraction, creating a chaotic conception, and concealing the way different strata and 
concepts integrate. Furthermore, critical realism cannot have a system-wide, historical perspective on 
capitalism because this contradicts the principle of multiple, discrete and different strata. Critical realism 
cannot conceive of a journey from abstract to concrete, yielding progressively richer, less ‘thin’ 
conceptions of agency - and other phenomena. Its agency-structure framework is a mistake because it is 
trans-historical and fails to integrate agents and structures. Its notions of free floating social structures 
obscure their necessary interconnections. It (mis)understands capitalism as one set of structures amongst 
many and as an open system.  
 
Now, the idea that critical realists `cleave´ the social world into discrete, separate, un-integratable strata is 
given legs by ambiguous terminology. Strata, layers and levels are often used interchangeably to refer to 
epistemological matters like levels of analysis and levels of abstraction, and ontological matters like the 
stratification of real, actual and `deep´ domains, levels of emergence and levels of capitalist society, 
multiple embeddedness etc. These terms are then used to discuss phenomena like structures, 
mechanisms, agents, stratification, emergence, abstraction and hierarchisation. Once this ambiguity is 
cleared up, however, the charge of `cleaving´ is weakened. It is, therefore, necessary to disambiguate key 
critical realist terms.  
 
Before doing this, two important features of systematic dialectics need mentioning. First, whilst the starting 
point for investigation is the object or system as a whole, the starting point for presentation is a particular 
category often referred to as the `cell form´. In the case of Marx´s analysis of capitalism, for example, the 
cell form is the commodity. Second, movement between categories and levels of abstraction are not 
arbitrary but systematic, and driven, step by step, by dialectical contradictions. For example, starting from 
the commodity, the contradiction between the categories labour power as a commodity, and exploitation, 
analysed at the level of `capital in production´, drives the move to the new category of the `production 
process proper´ and the new level of `capital as a principle of organisation´ (Smith 1990: 146). Brown 
refers to this as systematic or categorical presentation. Critical realists, he argues, cannot systematically 
and dialectically unfold their categories, step by step, via levels of abstraction, from the cell form because 




Disambiguating key terms 
This section disambiguates the following key concepts: structures, mechanisms, agents, stratification, 
emergence, abstraction and hierarchisation. 
 
Structures and mechanisms 
Sometimes the term `structure´ is used, generally, as a placeholder for phenomena such as structures, 
mechanisms, institutions, rules, conventions, norms, values, customs, powers etc.  Henceforth this 
placeholder will be referred to as `structures and mechanisms´. Sometimes, however, `structures´ and 
`mechanisms´ are used to refer to particular phenomena such as the structure of class, or the market 
mechanism. Importantly, structures and mechanisms never exist in splendid isolation, but are always 
reproduced or transformed by human agents. 
 
Now, some structures and mechanisms are historically specific and others are historically universal. The 
class structure is historically universal (at least since the emergence of surplus-product producing 
societies) whereas the class structure based upon ownership/control of capital is historically specific. The 
labour market mechanism is historically specific to commodity producing societies. Critical realist´s 
analysis of structures is not, therefore, necessarily trans-historical. See Elder-Vass (2010); Fleetwood 
(2008a and b); and Lopez & Scott (2000). 
 
Critical realists conceive of phenomena like the capitalist system as (minimally) a particular set of 
structures and mechanisms. There seems to be no reason why a systematic dialectician would object to 
the claim that capitalism consists of those structures and mechanisms that sustain the commodity, value 
and capital forms.  
 
Stratification 
Critical realists claim that the world is stratified into domains of the empirical, actual and (metaphoric) 
`deep´. Whilst the latter is sometimes referred to as the `real´, this (misleadingly) implies that the other 
domains are `unreal´. The term `deep´ is not only less ambiguous, it also implies a domain that is difficult, 
or perhaps even impossible, to observe and investigate, without a process of excavation or uncovering.  
 
Stratification refers to a distinction between what is empirically observed, what actually occurs and what 
causes that which occurs and is observed. The `deep´ includes structures and mechanisms. There seems 
to be no reason why a systematic dialectician would object, for example, to the claim that empirical 
observation of actual workplace conflict (e.g. a strike) is causally governed by `deep´ structures and 
mechanisms that sustain the commodification of labour power, exploitation and alienation. Moreover, if 
there is a real distinction between cause, actuality and observation, then the charge of `cleaving´ the three 
domains into discrete, separate, un-integratable strata and concepts, becomes problematic – for two 
reasons.  
 
First, the domains, and the phenomena located therein, are discrete and separate – that is the whole 
point. If they were not, then observation would be synonymous with underlying causes. In Marx´s terms, 
appearance would be synonymous with essence. Second, structures and mechanisms act tendentially, 
meaning they may, or may not, manifest themselves in actual and observed events. Gravity, for example, 
acts tendentially on my coffee cup, but it rarely falls to the floor (see Fleetwood 2012). This has important 
implications for integration. If, for example, the structures and mechanisms that sustain the 
commodification of labour power, exploitation and alienation act tendentially, then they do not always bring 
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about actual and observed workplace conflict. In this sense there is no integration between phenomena of 
the `deep´, actual and empirical. Importantly, these structures and mechanisms always tend to bring about 
workplace conflict. In this sense there is integration between these domains – albeit not always an 
empirically observable one. Incidentally, understanding this contradiction allows us to avoid the mistake of 
assuming that the absence of empirically observable workplace conflict (e.g. resistance) means the 
causes of conflict are also absent.    
 
Stratification is not, however, the same as  `vertical´ (or `horizontal´) divisions of the world into a conceptual 
hierarchy, such as industrial, national, supra-national and global, or regimes of accumulation, value chains, 
workplaces, vested interest groups and plural subjects – to cite two of Brown´s examples. This is better 
understood as what might be termed `hierarchisation´.  
 
Hierarchisation 
Hierarchisation is an epistemic practice, routinely carried out by social scientists of various stripes 
because it is a convenient way of ordering a complex social world as an aid to analysis. When Brown  
criticizes critical realists for `cleaving´ the social world into discrete, separate, un-integratable strata and 
concepts, hierarchisation is his real target. The concepts within a hierarchy are `free floating´. They are 
relatively arbitrary (because convenient) and thus have no necessary interconnections with one another. 
Hierarchisation is not, however, a specifically critical realist technique. Brown´s criticism would work only in 
cases where a critical realist (mis)represented some kind of hierarchy as a division between structures, 
mechanisms and agents; as stratification; as emergence, or as levels of abstraction.  
 
Emergence of entities with powers 
Phenomena existing at one level emerge from phenomena existing at a different level and have different 
properties. Brown accepts this, using the example of H2O emerging from hydrogen and oxygen. Groups 
emerge from individuals; social phenomena emerge from biological phenomena; biological phenomena 
emerge from chemical phenomena; chemical phenomena emerge from atomic phenomena. A capitalist 
firm emerges from a set of structures and mechanisms such as raw materials, machinery, managerial 
discourses, class relations – when, of course, acted upon by agents. With the emergence of the firm comes 
the emergent power to generate profit. This power is not found in any one of the firms components, but 
emerges when the firm emerges – i.e. emerges from `the system as a whole´ as Brown puts it. Emergence 
is necessary to prevent reductionism, either to individuals or to social wholes. See Elder-Vass (2010). 
 
The power of a UK university employee to vote for strike action to defend pensions, for example, is a power 
of the system as a whole – i.e. of social phenomena (e.g. degrees of political consciousness and confidence 
and the existence of a union), plus biological phenomena (e.g. hand muscles to place an X on the ballot 
paper), plus electro-chemical phenomena (to connect hand muscles and nervous system) and so on.  When a 
social scientist tries to explain a vote for strike action, s/he does not need to refer to biological and electro-
chemical phenomena. In parentheses, it is worth noting that, occasionally, a social scientist might need to 
consider other levels – e.g. investigation of ill-health and poor safety in the workplace might involve social 
and biological levels. Emergence allows him/her to remain at the level of the `social´, abstract from other 
phenomena and their associated levels, and focus upon, inter alia, the degrees of political consciousness of 
voters, the relationship between the union´s leadership and activists, the state of the pension fund, the political 
and economic climate, the intentions of the government vis-à-vis the provision of pensions and neo-liberal 
policies, the financial crisis and the crisis-prone nature of a capitalist economy. Thus the power to vote for 
strike action emerges from the system as a whole, the capitalist system as a whole - or the capitalist mode of 
production. Failure to analyse a strike, or for that matter, a capitalist firm, as part of the capitalist system as a 




Critical realism helps here. It directs our attention not only to the structures, mechanisms and agents that 
constitute a strike, or a capitalist firm, but also to the structures, mechanisms and agents that constitute the 
capitalist system as a whole and, therefore, to the integration of these two sets of phenomena. This keeps 
researchers asking: `What structures and mechanisms are involved?´ `Which agents are involved?´ How do 
these agents reproduce or transform these structures and mechanisms?´ This does not guarantee that 
research into strikes or firms (or other phenomena) is integrated with analysis of the capitalist system as a 
whole, but it certainly helps.  
 
The charge of `cleaving´ the social world does not work with emergent phenomena. No-one charges 
physicists of `cleaving´ H2O from hydrogen and oxygen, firstly because H2O really does have different 
properties than hydrogen and oxygen and secondly because H2O really exists at a different level than 
hydrogen and oxygen, making them discrete and separable phenomena. Similarly, we should not charge 
critical realists of `cleaving´ capitalist firms from individual workers and owners/managers, firstly because 
capitalist firms really do have different properties than individual workers and owners/managers and 
secondly because capitalist firms really exist at a different level than individual workers and 
owners/managers, making them discrete and separable phenomena. 
 
It is worth noting that emergence is an ontic phenomenon and should not be confused with hierarchisation 
which is epistemic. Unlike emergent phenomena, phenomena in a hierarchy can be arbitrary and, 
therefore, lack necessary interconnections with one another.   
 
Levels of abstraction 
Because the whole social world cannot be analysed `in one go´ as it were, one needs to omit much 
(indeed most) of it in order to analyse it; one needs to abstract. But there is more to the process of 
abstraction than this. When constructing a model of labour markets one might, for example, abstract from 
the social class of agents in order to concentrate on their gender. Abstracting does not, however, mean 
forgetting, and so at some point it will be necessary to bring class into the model and, moreover, do so 
without violating any earlier claims made when class was abstracted from. Many entities left out at the 
primary level of abstraction will be included at secondary, tertiary, (and subsequent) levels of abstraction. 
When done correctly, concepts included at later levels allow us to return to concepts that were merely 
sketched at earlier levels, to develop, augment or enhance them. As Brown puts it; `each new category 
retains and develops, rather than discards, the comprehension of the system provided by the previous 
category´. Thus levels of abstraction and, thereby, the concepts located in each level, should be 
sequential and developmental (see Sayer 1988 and 1992).  
 
Good abstractions `carve nature at its joints´. That is, one´s epistemology (i.e. the abstracted concept) 
corresponds to, expresses, grasps or reflects one´s ontology (i.e. the real object). For example, the 
capitalist firm, and the capitalist system as a whole, are good abstractions because they carve-out 
precisely those (and only those) components that constitute these objects – i.e. capitalist firms and the 
capitalist system. Good abstractions are also sequential and developmental. Concepts left out at the level 
of abstraction of `the firm´ should be included at intermediate levels and, ultimately, at the level of `the 
capitalist system´. Concepts included at later levels allow us to return to earlier concepts to develop, 
augment or enhance them. 
 
Bad abstractions simply fasten on concepts arbitrarily (e.g. for expositional convenience or mathematical 
tractability) preventing a correspondence between epistemology and ontology. Bad abstractions are not 
sequential and developmental. Concepts introduced at the level of abstraction of `the capitalist system´ 
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might have no precursors at the level of abstraction of `the firm´. Or concepts that were introduced at the 
level of abstraction of `the firm´ might be introduced in ways that prevent them being developed, 
augmented or enhanced – i.e. perhaps they were initially based upon knowingly false assumptions that, 
when removed, undermine the initial concepts. The result of bad abstraction is a chaotic ensemble of 
concepts at each level and across levels.  
 
Levels of abstraction should not be confused with hierarchisation, because the latter is merely a 
convenient, but arbitrary, way of ordering the social world.   
 
Structure and agency 
Bhaskar´s (1989) Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA), and Archer´s (1998) Morphogenetic-
Morphostatic (M-M) approach, gave the `agency-structure´ framework a level of sophistication missing in 
previous accounts such as Structuration Theory. Indeed, the M-M approach is now, arguably, the most 
sophisticated account of how (human) agents and structures integrate. The M-M approach can be 
sketched as follows. Agents do not create or produce structures and mechanisms ab initio, rather they 
reproduce (hence morphostatic) or transform (hence morphogenetic) a set of pre-existing structures and 
mechanisms.  Society continues to exist only because agents continue to reproduce or transform structures 
and mechanisms. Every action performed requires the pre-existence of structures and mechanisms which 
agents draw upon, and by drawing upon them, agents reproduce or transform them. For example, speaking 
requires the structure of grammar, and the operation of a capitalist workplace requires mechanisms for 
extracting profit. Structures and mechanisms, then, are the ever-present condition, and the continually 
reproduced or transformed outcome, of agents´ actions. There seems to be no reason why a systematic 
dialectician would object to the claim that the structures and mechanisms that sustain the commodity, 
value and capital forms (e.g. class structure, market mechanisms) are the ever-present condition, and the 
continually reproduced or transformed outcome, of agents´ actions.  
 
A central tenet of both the TMSA and the M-M approach, is the real (ontic) distinction (separation or 
hiatus) between agents and structures: they are different classes of thing. This means the charge of 
`cleaving´ the social world into discrete, separate, un-integratable strata and concepts becomes 
problematic. On the one hand, agents and structures are different classes of things, making them discrete 
and separate. But on the other hand, structures and mechanisms only exist because they are the reproduced 
or transformed outcome of agents´ actions, thereby integrating structures and mechanisms and agents. It is 
precisely this (long known) tension in the agency-structure framework that the TMSA and MM approaches 
have resolved. 
  
Thompson & Vincent´s diagram 
At this juncture it is possible to say a little about Thompson & Vincent´s diagram - cited by Brown. It is difficult 
to say whether it is an example of stratification, emergence, hierarchisation or abstraction, or something else. 
Clarity is not helped by the use of terms like `levels´, `constellations´, `multiple embeddedness´, `strata´ and 
`stratified entities´ - with the whole thing referred to as a `map´. I interpret this diagram as an example of 
hierarchisation, coupled with the M-M approach, for the following reasons. Vincent & Thompson are well 
aware that they are presenting a relatively crude, in-exhaustive, sketch or beginning. Much more detail would 
have to be provided before one could identify what exactly is emerging from what. There is no reference to 
abstraction, although abstraction at each level is presupposed. The division into five levels is done for 
expediency and based upon general recognition – which makes it arbitrary. Stratification, typically, refers to the 
domains of the empirical, actual and `deep´ and these are not part of the diagram – despite the title referring to 
`stratified entities´.  All this notwithstanding, one has to be careful of pushing an admittedly crude diagram 




Critical realism and systems 
Critical realists have written much about social systems being open, not closed, but little about systems 
per se – exceptions are Mingers (2007, 2011); Elder-Vass (2007) and Bhaskar (1993: 2.7 and 3.8) - who 
write of totalities not systems. The next section considers open and closed systems and is followed by a 
far more exploratory section on what critical realists might consider a system to be.  
 
Open and closed systems 
The critical realist concept of open and closed systems is simple, perhaps deceptively so – and should not 
be confused with open and closed systems in General Systems Theory. For critical realists, systems that 
display event regularities are closed; systems that do not display event regularities are open. This 
simplicity should not obscure the fact that event regularities and, therefore, closed systems, have an 
extremely precise meaning in the critical realist lexicon. This can be grasped via an example familiar to 
readers of this journal, namely, the alleged association between High Performance Work Practices 
(HPWP) and organisational performance. When HPWP are introduced (events x1, x2, x3….xn) into an 
organisation and its performance increases (event y), this organisation is referred to as a closed system. 
When HPWP are introduced in an organisation, and no regular pattern of events follows, it is an open 
system.  
 
This can be expressed as a mathematical function – deterministically as in (1) or stochastically or 
probabilistically as in (2) which is the kind of function used in statistical analysis.  
 
(1)    y = f (x1, x2, x3….xn)   
    
(2)    y =  α + β1X1 + β2X2, +  β3X3 +… βnXn + ε     
 
Two things are noteworthy here. First, systems displaying stochastic or probabilistic event regularities are 
just as closed as systems displaying deterministic event regularities. Second, tendencies are often 
(mis)understood as stochastic event regularities. Critical realists understand tendencies not as events and 
not, therefore, patterns or regularities in these events, but as the typical way of acting of a thing with 
properties (Fleetwood 2012).  
 
Now, critical realists did not arrive at the closed/open system conception from an analysis of systems 
themselves, but from an analysis of positivism. Bhaskar´s (1978) critique of positivism turns on a rejection of 
the Humean concept of causal laws - i.e. laws as event regularities. This concept of laws ties event regularities 
to experimentally closed conditions. It also presumes that closed systems are ubiquitous when in fact they are 
rare (and for the most part) artificially generated situations. 
 
So, are organisations open or closed systems? The empirical evidence is, at best, inconclusive. When HPWP 
are introduced, sometimes organisational performance increases, sometimes it decreases and sometimes it 
does not change (Fleetwood & Hesketh 2010). Whilst this cannot establish the existence of event regularities 
and closed systems, it is sufficient to establish the existence of event irregularities and open systems. The 
same goes for a great deal of other empirical research on other work and employment systems. When a trade 
union is introduced into a workplace, sometimes pay and conditions improve, sometimes they worsen and 
sometimes they do not change. When wage rates increase, sometimes the demand for labour decreases and 
the supply of labour increases, sometimes the demand for labour increases and the supply of labour 
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decreases, and sometimes they do not change. In short, organisations and other work and employment 
systems are almost certainly open systems.  
 
Brown claims that capitalism is not an open system because there exists regular systemic activities and 
social event regularities. Capitalism does not, he argues, just occasionally ‘shine through’ an otherwise 
chaotic flux of events, but impresses itself via our basic everyday economic activities, so one should try to 
fathom the systemic role of regular and systemic activities, forms and structures involved in making profit, 
earning wages, paying interest, paying rent, exchanging commodities etc. What Brown (and others) have 
in mind, appears to be the idea that, every day millions of workers go to work at the same place they did 
yesterday, clock on or sign in, take breaks, give and/or action instructions, respond (or not) to performance 
related payments (PRP), receive wages, take holidays, alter the amount of labour services they supply 
and so on. This is entirely sensible. Indeed, it makes perfect sense to say that work and employment 
systems, for example, are characterised by systematic working behaviour. But, systematic working 
behaviour is not synonymous with (even rough-and-ready) event regularities and is not, therefore, 
evidence of closed systems. There is no contradiction in arguing that work and employment systems are 
characterized by systematic working behaviour, whilst simultaneously arguing that they are characterized 
by a lack of event regularities and are, therefore, open systems.  
 
Note well that critical realism has no truck with positivism. When positivists see systematic working 
behaviour, their (methodological) intuition is to transpose it into law-like behaviour, formulate a hypothesis 
and test it empirically. Brown dismisses this as `the critical realist problematic, revolving around the 
[positivist] need to “compensate” for the inability to experimentally engineer social event regularities´. 
When critical realists see systematic working behaviour, their intuition is to ask: What structures and 
mechanisms might exist to causally govern this systematic working behaviour? The critical realist (causal-
explanatory) method requires neither the transposition of systematic working behaviour into event 
regularities nor the engineering of closed systems. It works entirely with open systems. It is not, therefore, 
that `the critical realist “open system” ontology obscures the very question, rather than helping to answer 
it´, this ontology provides a means for answering it – a means denied to positivism. Brown´s claim that 
critical realism misunderstands capitalism as an open system is itself a misunderstanding.  
 
Once clarified, one might accept the critical realist open/closed system distinction, accept that work and 
employment systems are open, and yet still be left asking: What do critical realists think a system is?   
 
The critical realist concept of system 
Mingers is the critical realist who has written most on systems. For him:  
 
A system can be defined generically as a collection of entities of any kind…that form a 
whole, the behaviour of which depends on the relations between the entities (Mingers 2007: 
451). 
 
Defining a system in terms of its components and their relations is effectively to delineate its 
boundary (Mingers 2011: 319).  
 
A social system is a collection of structures and mechanisms, the agents who reproduce and transform 
them, relations between these agents, and relations between these structures and mechanisms. 
Boundaries are one of the key problems for many attempts to delineate systems, but not for critical realists 
because they do not start by attempting to establish the boundary, they arrive at it. The analysis itself 





Consider a workplace (W), understood to consist of structures and mechanisms (SMw) that causally govern 
the production of commodities and profit; agents qua employees (Ae) who reproduce or transform (SMw); 
relations between employees (Re); and relations between structures and mechanisms (Rsm). W could be 
described as: SMw + Ae + Re + Rsm and this collection would determine the boundary – the notation has no 
mathematical connotation, it is used merely to aid exposition. Suppose closer inspection reveals that some 
of W´s employees are not strictly employees but agency workers (Aa) who often work in other workplaces. 
Critical realists would extend the analysis to accommodate these additional agents. W could now be 
described as SMw + Ae + Aa + Re + Rsm and this collection would determine the boundary. Suppose even 
closer inspection reveals that, because of supply chains, some of W´s structures and mechanisms are 
shared with other workplaces such as Z (SMz). W could now be described as SMw + SMz +  Ae + Aa +Re + 
Rsm and this collection would determine the boundary. 
 
This kind of analysis could be extended to any system, including the capitalist system. The capitalist system 
could be understood to consist of structures and mechanisms that causally govern the commodity, value and 
capital forms, the agents that reproduce or transform them and associated relations. If systematic dialecticians 
can accept this, then the claim that critical realism misunderstands capitalism as one set of structures (and 
mechanisms) amongst many seems misplaced.  
 
Why systematic dialectics needs critical realism  
Systematic dialectics needs the M-M approach (or something similar) in order to explain how 
contradictions exert their causal influence upon agents. Categories are incapable of doing anything (such 
as unfolding systematically and dialectically) until acted upon by human agents. Marx makes a similar 
argument when he observes that: `Commodities cannot take themselves to market, and perform 
exchanges in their own right´ (Marx 1974: 178). For dialectical contradictions to exert their causal 
influence on agents, something must `connect´ the contradictions and the agents. The obvious candidate 
is structures and mechanisms and, in this context, institutions – i.e. sets of tacit rules or norms. There are 
two ways this can occur. First, contradictions can be experienced consciously as constraints or 
enablements on agents´ decisions and actions. Contradictions exert a conscious causal influence on 
agents. Second, contradictions can be experienced unconsciously as institutions that, via a process of 
habituation, become internalised as habits. Contradictions exert an unconscious causal influence on 
agents.  
 
This is easier to understand with an example – in this case, from a systematic dialectician.  
 
The category `labour power as a commodity´ defines a structure in which disparities of 
wealth lead one class to own/control considerable productive resources while another does 
not, with the latter selling their labour power to the former. It is a category of simple unity in 
that it refers to the reciprocal agreement in the wage contract that directly unites wage 
labour and capital. However, given the structural parameters defined by the category, a 
dominant structural tendency necessarily arises that points away from simple unity. The 
controllers of capital possess both the productive resources of the society and a 
considerable reserve fund. Their subsistence is thereby guaranteed. Workers, in contrast, 
do not possess any reserves beyond their hands and minds, which they must hire out if they 
and their families are to survive. Wage labour must bargain wage contracts from a 




The contradictions that drive exploitation operate on agents via the structures and mechanisms of class 
and institutions that are themselves shaped by class – e.g. the tacit rules and norms that govern the 
labour process. This M-M approach, with its conceptual apparatus of structures, mechanisms, rules and 
norms, all reproduced or transformed by agents, is perfectly suited to explain how dialectical 
contradictions exert their causal influence on agents. Without the M-M approach (or something similar) 
systematic dialecticians cannot explain how contradictions exert their causal influence upon agents. 
 
The above argument has a `flip-side´ that Brown does not mention, but other systematic dialecticians do – 
and it is important for my concluding comments. Systematic dialecticians accept that not all phenomena 
are dialectical. For Albritton (2007: 85) non-dialectical phenomena `escape strict dialectical reasoning´, 
whereas Smith (1990: 105) claims they are not an `appropriate topic for categorical analysis´. Non-
dialectical phenomena cannot, of course, be systematically and dialectically unfolded, step by step, from a 
carefully chosen starting point. Consider two examples. 
 
First, the structure of gender, that is, the relation between men and women, often takes the form of 
domestic labour. Women, typically, end up performing domestic labour alongside wage labour, thereby 
experiencing a `double burden´. Unlike wage labour, domestic labour cannot be systematically and 
dialectically unfolded from the commodity form because domestic labour is not a form of value - see 
Brown´s diagram 2. Second, flexible working practices such as temporary working, term-time working or 
shift working, cannot be systematically and dialectically unfolded from the commodity form either, because 
these kinds of flexible working `escape strict dialectical reasoning´. They are, in many ways, entirely 
arbitrary forms taken by wage labour. Whereas systematic dialectics offers no guidance about how to deal 
with non-dialectical phenomena like domestic labour, or flexible working, critical realism offers the M-M 
approach. 
 
Conclusion: a critical realist model of labour markets  
Brown criticizes critical realists for using `pseudo abstraction´ and, therefore, being unable to conceive of a 
journey from the abstract to the concrete, yielding progressively richer, less thin, (i.e. more concrete) 
conceptions. This can be countered by making use of a recently developed model of labour markets. I 
take the liberty of using my own work for four reasons. First, I want to present something other than 
Marx´s model of the capitalist system, because this is virtually always used to exemplify systematic 
dialectics. Second, it is the only model of its kind I am aware of that has an explicitly critical realist 
orientation. Third, it makes explicit use of levels of abstraction. Fourth, labour markets will be of interest to 
many readers of this journal.  
 
Labour markets can be defined as:   
 
sets of socio-economic phenomena [including structures and mechanisms] that are reproduced 
or transformed by labour market agents who draw upon these phenomena in order to engage in 
actions they think (consciously or unconsciously) will meet their employment-related needs 
(Fleetwood 2011: 19). 
 
The (more) complete model presented in (Fleetwood 2011) includes an analysis of workers supplying 
labour services and firms hiring them. In the slightly truncated version presented below, only the former 
analysis is presented – although this is sufficient to exemplify a `journey from the abstract to the concrete´. 
The model is depicted via two diagrams. Diagrams 1 and 2 below relate to figures 1 and 3 in Fleetwood 





Diagram 1 here  
 
 
Diagram one captures the first level of abstraction. It introduces a labour force divided into several 
categories, production, reproduction and preparation of labour power, information, job queue and the point 
of contact between potential worker and potential employer. The supporting narrative imagines a family; 
that family having a child; that child being socialised, educated and skilled and so prepared (physically and 
mentally) for his/her eventual involvement in labour markets; informed about the available jobs; and 
informed about how to join the labour queue and get recruited.  
 
Diagram 2 here 
 
The second level of abstraction is captured in diagram two – although first level concepts are not absent in 
the second level, a point illustrated by the use of shading. The second level includes more concepts, 
namely, health, household, transport, self-employment, unions, historical legacy, legislation, education and 
training, and ideology. The supporting narrative imagines a firm deciding upon crewing levels, on-the job 
training, and managing technical and labour processes. But there is more to it than merely including more 
concepts.  
 
At the first level of abstraction, reproduction and preparation of labour power, for example, are introduced 
but with little or no elaboration. It is not until education and training, and ideology are introduced at the 
second level of abstraction that reproduction and preparation of labour power can be understood in a more 
adequate manner. The supporting narrative explains that reproduction and preparation of labour power is 
not simply a matter of education and training, but also of ideology as young workers are `groomed´ for a 
life of short-term contracts, and business-friendly forms of flexible working patterns, with little or no security 
and minimum wages. In other words, at the end of the second level of abstraction, concepts introduced at 
the first level become richer and less thin than when they appeared in the first level.  
 
Whilst the analysis stops with two levels of abstraction, there is nothing to prevent third, fourth or 
subsequent levels being added. Already mentioned concepts (e.g. health, households, transport, self-
employment, unions, historical legacy, legislation) could be made richer and less thin, and new concepts 
(e.g. state and macroeconomic conditions and policy) could be added.   
 
It is instructive to wrap all this up by presenting an anticipated objection to this model of labour markets, 
followed by an objection to this objection. A systematic dialectician would almost certainly raise the 
accusation of `pseudo abstraction´. The concepts and levels of abstraction are chosen arbitrarily, or at 
best on the basis of appearing to fit together in some kind of sequence – i.e. workers need to be produced 
(born and raised) before they can be prepared, and prepared before they can join the job queue. The shift 
between levels of abstraction could have been carried out in any of several, arbitrary, ways. The end 
product is a chaotic conception of labour markets (theoretically) `cleaved´ into multiple, discrete and 
different strata, analysed in separation from one another and, therefore, un-integratable.  
 
The objection runs into a problem when applying systematic dialectics to the construction of a model of 
(something like) labour markets. This would, presumably, involve the systematic and dialectical unfolding 
of concepts, step by step, via levels of abstraction, from the cell form of the labour market. It is not, 
however, clear what the cell form of labour markets is, what the appropriate concepts are, what their 
inherent contradictions are, how these concepts should unfold, or what the appropriate levels of 
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abstraction and shifts between them are. The same problems would almost certainly arise in any attempt 
to apply systematic dialectics to other work and employment related phenomena such as industrial 
relations conflict.  
 
I do not know what the cell form of labour markets is. It is, of course, possible that the cell form of labour 
markets happens to be that shared with the cell form of capitalism (i.e. the commodity and the 
commodification of labour power), but this would be just good luck. What about those cases where `lady 
luck´ is not present? What if the phenomenon under investigation was domestic labour? What is the cell 
form of domestic labour? Even if the cell form of labour markets is the commodity, highly abstract 
concepts like commodity, money, value and capital are not much help here, because a model of labour 
markets must include relatively concrete concepts. Some labour market phenomena (e.g. the reserve 
army of unemployed or under-employed, the value of labour power, flexible working practices) can be 
mentioned at highly abstract levels of analysis, but at these levels they would be thin concepts. When the 
time comes to introduce richer concepts, it is not clear which ones should be used, other than the ones 
already in the model – e.g. labour force, production, reproduction and preparation of labour power, 
information, job queues, self-employment, unions, legislation, education, training, and ideology. Moreover, 
it is not clear how the systematic and dialectical development of these concepts should unfold because 
these phenomena are non-dialectical and, therefore, `escape strict dialectical reasoning´. Finally, it is not 
clear how the levels of abstraction should be established, and the shifts managed, again, other than 
(something like) the way they appear in the model. In short, even if systematic dialectics is helpful in 
constructing a model of the capitalist system as a whole, it offers little help in constructing a model of 
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